Petrobras and Pemex signed a memorandum of understanding on Tuesday in Rio de Janeiro to cooperate in exploration, production, and industrial processes. The gesture can be read as a political signal between two close governments, headed by Lula da Silva and Claudia Sheinbaum, but the underlying question is not whether Brazil and Mexico share a state-oriented sensitivity regarding energy, but why Petrobras comes to the table as a company with international muscle, corporate discipline, and exportable technology, while Pemex arrives seeking capabilities that it lost or never fully managed to consolidate.
The difference is not that Petrobras has ceased to be state-owned. The Brazilian Government retains control of the common shares and, therefore, decisive influence over the company. The difference is that this control coexists with a market structure that imposes checks and balances. Common and preferred shares listed on the stock exchange, a broad base of private investors, corporate governance rules, committees, compliance standards, and a board with independent participation are among the characteristics of the Brazilian oil company. After the trauma of Lava Jato, Petrobras strengthened internal controls, transparency, auditing, and decision-making processes that reduce the room for operating solely as an administrative arm of the Executive.
That architecture makes it possible to contain the political element. Although Petrobras continues to respond to national priorities, the company cannot completely ignore the cost of capital, the profitability of its projects, the reaction of the markets, or the evaluation of its partners. That is why its recent internationalization does not look like oil diplomacy, but rather a business strategy. In Colombia, it operates the Sirius gas project together with Ecopetrol. In Namibia, it took a stake in an exploration license together with TotalEnergies. In São Tomé and Príncipe, it has acquired offshore positions. In Ivory Coast, it is seeking deepwater blocks. In all these cases, Petrobras moves as a company that monetizes its main technological advantage, its experience in deep and ultra-deep waters.
The agreement with Pemex fits into that logic, covering deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, mature fields, seismic reprocessing, refining, petrochemicals, fertilizers, gas, energy efficiency, emissions reduction, and lower-carbon-intensity fuels, among other related areas. For the moment, it does not commit investments or create a joint venture; it only opens an entry point to review data, measure returns, and evaluate whether there is a business opportunity.
That is the central difference between the two companies. Petrobras explores cooperation, but under viability filters; Pemex needs cooperation because its financial and operational margin remains narrow, and it seeks it in Petrobras because it is the option that political rhetoric allows. After years of opposition to the energy reform, the oil rounds, and the entry of major private oil companies, cooperating with a Latin American state-owned company, even though it increasingly operates with the logic of a private company, is more defensible than openly acknowledging the need for external capabilities.
The contrast is uncomfortable for Mexico because both countries claim energy sovereignty, but Brazil allowed its oil company to preserve scale, ambition, and business discipline within a market that continued to function. Petrobras did not grow isolated from the State, but rather in an environment where the ANP maintained oil rounds, competitive bidding processes, and rules for partnering with other companies in exploration and production. That institutional framework forced Petrobras to compete, partner, and justify capital.
Pemex, in contrast, carries the burden of fiscal pressure, debt, operational deterioration, and a narrative that confuses state control with industrial strength. Added to this is an energy reform that remained halfway completed and was politically dismantled before becoming institutionally consolidated, and that never fully translated into a new governance structure for the company. Yes, Mexico can learn from Petrobras, but signing memorandums is not enough. It must observe how a public company can act with the logic of a private company without denying its national origin. The lesson to be learned is how to shield it from decisions that destroy capital and reward projects capable of competing outside the budget.
This article was originally published by La Prensa OEM.
Date: July 4, 2026
Link: https://oem.com.mx/la-prensa/analisis/opinion-por-alejandro-sanchez-pemex-y-petrobras-mas-alla-de-la-afinidad-politica-30924435.html?app=true [Online]