According to the latest data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in the month of April U.S. oil production broke a record, reaching 13,934 thousand barrels per day (mbd). After the conflict with Iran, the country not only positioned itself as the largest oil producer in the world, covering a large part of the production losses of Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and others.
One of the producing areas that also broke a record is the offshore Gulf of Mexico in U.S. territory. For the first time, U.S. offshore production exceeded 2,100 mbd. Taking 2016 into account, production increased by more than 600 mbd in less than 10 years.
This takes on particular relevance because during the same period, in Mexico, production has fallen significantly. In 2015, Mexico’s offshore production was 1,768 mbd, according to the latest public record; by the beginning of 2026 it was already around 1,100 mbd. This is precisely close to 600 mbd less in less than 10 years in the Gulf of Mexico.
Production on both sides of the border has practically reversed, and at the core there is an institutional issue. In 2015, Mexico was launching the oil rounds as a result of the 2013 constitutional changes; in 2018 the last of them took place, even before the new administration of López Obrador took office. The new policy promoted by the administration would be to bet on Pemex, and in recent years the bet has not produced the expected results.
By contrast, in the United States more than 20 bidding rounds have been carried out in the Gulf of Mexico for oil concessions, in addition to one in March of this year, and the next one will take place next August; the plan continues periodically to tender 27 more between now and 2040.
The difference is not minor. While Mexico suspended the mechanism that allowed the incorporation of new operators, capital, and technology, the United States maintained a continuous schedule to develop its resources in the Gulf of Mexico. Not all bidding rounds become immediate production, nor are all projects successful, but they do generate a permanent portfolio of opportunities. In a long-term industry, that continuity matters.
Mexico’s problem is not only that it produces less oil. The problem is that it stopped building the conditions to produce more in the future. Pemex remains a central company for the country, but it faces financial, operational, and technological limitations that are not resolved through political discourse alone. Betting everything on a single company, in a high-risk industry with high investment requirements, reduced the room for maneuver precisely when the country needed to expand it.
The comparison in the Gulf of Mexico clearly shows the result of two different decisions. The United States increased its offshore production by an amount similar to what Mexico lost, while on one side there was institutional continuity, bidding rounds, and new projects, and on the other a concentration of decisions that failed to stop the decline. The maritime border not only separates oil-producing territories, it also shows two different ways of converting resources into production.
This article was originally published by La Prensa OEM.
Date: July 10, 2026
Link: https://oem.com.mx/la-prensa/analisis/opinion-paul-alejandro-la-extraccion-de-petroleo-de-eu-en-el-golfo-supera-la-de-mexico-31043965 [Online]